




Memory and cognitive control in an integrated theory of language processing 
Commentary on Pickering, M. J., & Garrod, S. (2013). An integrated theory of language 
production and comprehension. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, 329-347. 
 
L. Robert Slevc & Jared M. Novick 









This is a postprint version of the following article:  
Slevc, L.R. & Novick, J.M. (2013). Memory and cognitive control in an integrated theory of 
language processing. Commentary on M. J. Pickering & S. Garrod ‘An integrated theory of 
language production and comprehension.’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36(4), 373-374.  
Published in final form at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X12002683 
© 2013 Cambridge University Press  
Postprint of Slevc & Novick (2013). BBS, 36, 373-4. 
Abstract 
Pickering and Garrod’s integrated model of production and comprehension includes no 
explicit role for non-linguistic cognitive processes.  Yet, how domain-general cognitive functions 
contribute to language processing has become clearer with well-specified theories and supporting 
data.  We therefore believe that their account can benefit by incorporating functions like working 
memory and cognitive control into a unified model of language processing 
Postprint of Slevc & Novick (2013). BBS, 36, 373-4. 
Pickering and Garrod offer an integrated model of language processing that subsumes 
production and comprehension into a single cognitive framework, treating language as a form of 
action and action perception (cf. Clark, 1996).  This model draws from previous work linking 
prediction to language comprehension (e.g., Rhode, Levy, & Kehler, 2011) and production (e.g., 
Dell, Burger, & Svec, 1997), and fits with the more general idea that we interpret our world not 
only by analyzing incoming information, but also by initiating proactive processes of prediction 
and expectation (Bar, 2009).  
Although memory processes are not explicit in Pickering and Garrod’s framework, the 
model invokes the maintenance and evaluation of multiple predictions and percepts, and relies on 
the retrieval of contextual information to create forward, anticipatory models of individuals’ 
linguistic and nonlinguistic actions.  Memory and other cognitive functions are presumably an 
important part of these processes.  A large body of work has investigated how language 
processing interfaces with other cognitive abilities but, like most psycholinguistic research, this 
has progressed mainly independently in studies of language comprehension and production.  
Despite this divide, recent work is converging on similar conclusions about the types of 
nonlinguistic cognitive systems that are critically involved in language production and 
comprehension.  This suggests that the role of these cognitive systems might fruitfully be 
included in the forward modeling processes advocated in Pickering and Garrod’s framework.  
We highlight how a few aspects of this framework might draw on other cognitive systems.   
Generating a prediction (of one’s own or another’s speech) relies heavily on memory 
processes. Indeed, anticipating how an utterance or a discourse will unfold necessarily depends 
on the rapid coordination of considerable linguistic and contextual evidence (Altmann & 
Kamide, 1999; Tanenhaus, 2007). To predict effectively (and thus avoid confusion or 
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misinterpretation), current input must be linked to representations in working memory and in a 
longer-term store of prior experience. Moreover, individuals must be able to update and override 
these representations as new input is encountered moment by moment.  
In the case of prediction-by-association, language users must retrieve situation-relevant 
information and schemas from memory as well as encode relevant information for use in future 
associative predictions.  It is thus unsurprising that the ease with which interlocutors can 
successfully encode and retrieve relevant associations in memory relates to how successfully 
they can align their discourse models, both in terms of the utterance choices that speakers make 
(Horton & Gerrig, 2005) and the interpretations that listeners reach (Brown-Schmidt, 2009).   
Prediction-by-simulation, too, likely relies on memory processes.  For example, the 
accessibility of information in memory influences how and when information is produced (Slevc, 
2011), and because prediction-by-simulation relies on internal production mechanisms, memory-
based accessibility must also influence the prediction of others’ speech.  This is indeed the case.  
For example, anaphor resolution is sensitive to the cognitive prominence of antecedents (Cowles, 
Walenski, & Kluender, 2007), and more accessible syntactic structures are easier to parse 
(Branigan, Pickering, & McLean, 2005).  Additionally, irrelevant information active in memory 
can interfere with both production (Slevc, 2011) and parsing (Fedorenko, Gibson, & Rohde, 
2006), which in some cases could be construed as interference with one’s successful prediction 
of upcoming material in real-time.  
In a sense, memory underlies the generation of predictions—linguistic and otherwise—
and, conversely, it is when predictions are not met that linguistic information is better learned or 
encoded into memory (e.g., Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006).  There is thus a tight linkage of 
memory and language processes; in fact, the processes of forward modeling involved in language 
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processing may even be the foundation for much of our verbal memory ability (cf. Acheson & 
MacDonald, 2009). 
But it is not just the act of generating predictions that relies on non-linguistic cognitive 
processes.  Another crucial component of Pickering and Garrod’s model is monitoring, i.e., 
comparing predicted to observed utterance precepts.  This comparison presumably involves a 
process of detecting mismatch (or conflict) and resolving any discovered incompatibility.  
Mounting evidence suggests that conflict detection and its resolution via cognitive control plays 
an important role in both language comprehension and production (Novick, Kan, Trueswell, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2009).  During comprehension, conflict is a natural byproduct of incremental 
parsing: when late-arriving evidence is inconsistent with a reader’s or listener’s current 
representation of sentence meaning, conflict resolution and cognitive control functions deploy to 
revise earlier processing commitments (Novick, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2005). 
Presumably this applies to the monitoring function as well: conflict resolution processes must 
adjudicate when an utterance precept is inconsistent with a speaker’s or listener’s expectation.  
Linguistic conflict resolution functions depend on the involvement of the left inferior 
frontal gyrus (IFG), an area recruited when conflict must be resolved during nonlinguistic 
memory tasks (Jonides & Nee, 2006).  If conflict resolution underlies processing in a shared 
production/comprehension system, then deficits in these conflict resolution functions (e.g., in 
patients with circumscribed lesions to left IFG) should yield both expressive and receptive 
language deficits when linguistic representations conflict.  This is indeed the case: such patients 
are known to have selective memory impairments when conflict/interference demands are high 
(Hamilton & Martin, 2007; Thompson-Schill et al., 2002) and they also suffer concomitant 
production and comprehension impairments under similar conditions (Novick et al., 2009).  
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In sum, we believe that an important extension of Pickering and Garrod’s model is to 
consider how language processing interfaces with other cognitive systems such as working 
memory and cognitive control.  This raises a number of questions; for example, how general or 
specific are the cognitive systems involved in prediction and monitoring?  If domain-general, 
which domain-general mechanisms are involved – e.g., what are the roles of implicit and explicit 
memory, and do other executive functions contribute?  Consideration of these types of issues is 
likely to lead toward a more fully integrated theory of language processing and of cognitive 




Postprint of Slevc & Novick (2013). BBS, 36, 373-4. 
References 
Acheson, D. J., & MacDonald, M. C. (2009). Verbal working memory and language production: 
Common approaches to the serial ordering of verbal information. Psychological Bulletin, 
135(1), 50–68. 
Altmann, G. T. M. & Kamide, Y. (1999). Incremental interpretation at verbs: Restricting the 
domain of subsequent reference. Cognition, 73, 247-264. 
Bar, M. (2009). The proactive brain: Memory for predictions. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B, 364, 1235-1243. 
Branigan, H. P., Pickering, M. J., & McLean, J. F. (2005). Priming prepositional-phrase 
attachment during language comprehension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31, 468–481. 
Brown-Schmidt, S. (2009). The role of executive function in perspective taking during online 
language comprehension. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16(5), 893-900. 
Chang, F., Dell, G. S., & Bock, K. (2006). Becoming syntactic. Psychological Review, 113(2), 
234-272. 
Clark, H. H. (1996). Using Language. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Cowles, H. W., Walenski, M., & Kluender, R. (2007). Linguistic and cognitive prominence in 
anaphor resolution: Topic, contrastive focus and pronouns. Topoi, 26, 3-18. 
Dell, G. S., Burger, L. K. & Svec, W. R. (1997). Language production and serial order: A 
functional analysis and a model. Psychological Review, 104(1), 123-147. 
Fedorenko, E., Gibson, E., & Rohde, D. (2006). The nature of working memory capacity in 
sentence comprehension: Evidence against domain-specific working memory resources. 
Journal of Memory & Language, 54, 541-553. 
Hamilton, A. C. & Martin, R. C. (2007). Proactive interference in a semantic short-term memory 
deficit: Role of semantic and phonological relatedness. Cortex, 43, 112-123. 
Horton, W. S. & Gerrig, R. J. (2005). The impact of memory demands on audience design during 
language production. Cognition, 96, 127-142. 
Jonides, J., & Nee, D. E. (2006). Brain mechanisms of proactive interference in working 
memory. Neuroscience, 139(1), 181–93. 
Novick, J. M., Kan, I. P., Trueswell, J. C., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2009). A case for conflict 
across multiple domains: memory and language impairments following damage to 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 26(6), 527–67.  
 
Postprint of Slevc & Novick (2013). BBS, 36, 373-4. 
Novick, J. M., Trueswell, J. C., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2005). Cognitive control and parsing: 
Reexamining the role of Broca’s area in sentence comprehension. Cognitive, Affective, & 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 5(3), 263–281. 
Rhode, H., Levy, R., & Kehler, A. (2011). Anticipating explanations in relative clause 
processing. Cognition, 118, 339-358. 
Slevc, L. R. (2011). Saying what’s on your mind: Working Memory effects on sentence 
production. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
37(6), 1503-1514. 
Tanenhaus, M. K. (2007). Eye movements and spoken language processing. In R. P. G. van 
Gompel, M. H. Fischer, W. S. Murray, & R. L. Hill (Eds.), Eye Movements: A Window 
on Mind and Brain (pp. 309-326). Oxford: Elsevier.  
Thompson-Schill, S. L., Jonides, J., Marshuetz, C., Smith, E. E., D’Esposito, M., Kan, I. P., 
Knight, R. T., & Swick, D. (2002). Effects of frontal lobe damage on interference effects 
in working memory. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 2(2), 109-120. 
 
 
 
